We compare the Egalitarian Equivalent and the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes rules to divide a bundle of goods (heirlooms) or a bundle of bads (chores).
Introduction
User-friendly platforms like SPLIDDIT, Adjusted Winner, or The Fair Division Calculator 1 implement theoretical solutions to a variety of fair division problems, among them the classic distribution of a bundle of divisible commodities (the "manna"). The key simplification is that these platforms ask visitors to report linear preferences (additive utilities), instead of potentially complex ArrowDebreu preferences. Say we divide the family heirlooms: each participant on SPLIDDIT must distribute 1000 points over the different objects, and these "bids" are interpreted as her fixed marginal rates of substitution. Eliciting complementarities between these objects is potentially a complex task with 6 objects, an outright impossible one with 10 or more, hence the design choice of deliberately ignoring them. For the same reason combinatorial auction mechanisms never ask buyers to report a ranking of all subsets of objects, ( [2] , [30] , [6] ). The proof of the pudding is in the eating: visitors use these sites in the tens of thousands, fully aware of the interpretation of their bids ( [10] ).
The two theoretical division rules used on the first two sites above are the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes (for short, Competitive) rule and the Egalitarian Equivalent (for short Egalitarian) rule: see [29] and [19] respectively. The latter finds an efficient allocation where everyone is indifferent between his share and a common fraction of the entire manna. The former identifies prices of the commodities and a common budget constraint at which the competitive demands are feasible, and implement these demands. Here we critically compare the performance of these two rules in the additive domain.
Fair division problems may involve bads (non disposable items generating disutility) as well as goods (disposable, desirably commodities). For the former think of workers distributing tasks (house chores, job shifts among substitutable workers ( [4] ) like teaching loads, babysitting, etc.), cities sharing noxious facilities, managers allocating cuts in the company's workforce between their respective units, and so on. For the latter, the family heirlooms ( [20] ), the assets of divorcing partners ( [3] ), office space between the colleagues, seats in overdemanded business school courses ( [24] , [5] ), computing resources in peer-to-peer platforms ( [9] ), and so on.
If we divide goods both rules, Competitive and Egalitarian, are single-valued (utilitywise), easy to compute, and vary continuously in the marginal utility parameters. This is clear for the latter rule, and for the former one it follows from the celebrated Eisenberg-Gale theorem ( [7] , [22] ): the Competitive allocations also maximize the Nash product of utilities over all feasible allocations. We invoke two normative properties to argue that the Competitive rule outperforms the Egalitarian rule. One is the familiar Resource Monotonicity (RM), stating that an increase of the "good" manna should improve at least weakly everyone's welfare. The Competitive rule meets RM but the Egalitarian does not.
The second axiom is new, though it can be traced to Maskin Monotonicity (see Subsection 5.3). Independence of Lost Bids (ILB) is predicated on the observation that, when utilities are additive, at an efficient allocation most of the entries in the consumption matrix (specifying how much each agent eats of each good) are zero. If agent i does not consume good a at all, we call his marginal utility u ia a "lost bid". ILB states that changing i's lost bid u ia should have no effect on the outcome, as long this bid remains lost. This property has important incentives consequences. Recall that, even in the additive domain,no reasonable division rule (e. g., treating equals equally) can be both efficient and strategyproof ( [21] ). A consequence of ILB is that an agent cannot benefit by a small misreport of her lost bids. The Competitive rule meets ILB: it is still vulnerable to misreports of one's winning bids, but the profitable direction of misreports depends upon the entire problem, so it requires a fair amount of information. By contrast, the Egalitarian rule fails ILB, and the (small) profitable misreports are entirely clear: one should inflate lost bids and deflate winning bids: Lemma 4 in Subsection 5.3.
Combined with efficiency and symmetry properties, ILB characterizes the Competitive division rule.
Turning to the division of bads we find, somewhat surprisingly, that the Competitive rule is much harder to handle. The main difficulty is that we may have many different competitive utility profiles, even exponentially many in (the smallest of) the number of bads and of agents (Subsection 5.4). There is no obvious way to deal with this embarrassing multiplicity. In particular every selection of the Competitive correspondence is discontinuous in the parameters (marginal utilities) of the economy, and this is also true of any selection of the much larger correspondence of efficient and Envy Free allocations. The (long) proof uses the fact that the set of efficient and envy-free allocations, and the corresponding disutility profiles, can have close to 2 3 n connected components. Finally, computing the competitive allocations of bads is not a convex optimization problem as in the case of goods, and with more than two agents we do not know of any efficient algorithms discovering them.
By contrast the Egalitarian rule to divide bads is the mirror image of the rule for goods, and shares the same properties: it is single-valued and continuous in the utility parameters (as well as in the manna). We conclude that the Egalitarian is a more practical approach to the division of bads than the Competitive one, or any Envy-Free single-valued rule.
Contents After the literature review in Section 2, the model is defined in Section 3, and our two division rules in Section 4. Section 5 contains our normative comparison of the two rules. The Egalitarian rule ensures to each agent strictly more than her Fair Share utility or disutility (Subsection 5.1). The Competitive rule for goods is Resource Monotonic (Subsection 5.2), and satisfies Independence of Lost Bids (subsection 5.3). We divide bads in the last two Subsections: we discuss successively the multiplicity issue (5.4) then the discontinuity issue (5.5). All substantial proofs are in Section 6.
2 Related literature 1. Our main motivation is the recent stream of work in algorithmic mechanism design on the fair division of goods, recognizing the practical convenience of additive utilities and the conceptual advantages of the Competitive solution. For instance in the same model as here, Megiddo and Vazirani ([15] ) show that the Competitive utility profile depends continuously upon the rates of substitution and the total endowment; Jain and Vazirani ( [13] ) that it is can be computed in time polynomial in the dimension n + p of the problem.
Steinhaus' 1948 "cake-division" model ( [25] ), also assumes linear preferences represented by atomless measures over, typically, a compact euclidean set. It contains our model for goods as the special case where the measures are piecewise constant. Sziklai and Segal-Halevi ( [23] ) show that the Eisenberg-Gale Theorem still holds, and that the Competitive rule is Resource Monotonic (see the Remark in Subsection 6.3).
2. In the companion paper [1] we consider the more general problem of dividing a "mixed manna" containing both goods and bads, as when we dissolve a partnership with both valuable assets and liabilities. Our first observation is that the Egalitarian rule is no longer well defined, because there may be no efficient allocation where everybody is indifferent to consuming a common fraction of the entire manna (or of any common benchmark bundle). So the competitive rule wins our contest by default.
The main message of [1] is that mixed manna problems are of two types. If goods overwhelm bads 2 the Competitive rule behaves just like an all goods problem: it picks a maximizes the product of utilities, yields a unique utility profile, is resource monotonic and continuous. But if instead bads overwhelm goods we are back to the potentially messy situation of an all bads problems with a host of different competitive divisions and no continuous selection from this set.
3. Four decades earlier, the microeconomic literature on the fair division of private goods insisted on working in the much larger domain of Arrow-Debreu preferences, where the relation between the Nash product of utilities and the Competitive rule is lost, and provided several axiomatic characterizations of the latter. The most popular result appears first in Hurwicz ([12] ) and Gevers ([8] ), and is refined by Thomson ([27] ) and Nagahisa ([18] ): any efficient and Pareto indifferent rule meeting (some variants of) Maskin Monotonicity (MM) must contain the Competitive rule. Our Independence of Lost Bids axiom is in fact a weak variant of MM for the linear domain, and the proof of our characterization result (Proposition 3) mimics the standard argument.
Division problems and division rules
The finite set of agents is N with generic element i, and |N | = n ≥ 2. The finite set of divisible items is A with generic element a and |A| = p ≥ 2. The manna consists of one unit of each item. We assume the manna contains either only goods, or only bads, and we use the same notation for both types of problems. Agent i's allocation (or share) is z i ∈ [0, 1] A ; the profile z = (z i ) i∈N is a feasible allocation if
the vector in R
A + with all coordinates equal to 1. The set of feasible allocations is Φ(N, A).
Each agent is endowed with linear preferences over [0, 1] A , represented by a vector u i ∈ R A + , a utility function in the case of goods, a disutility function in that of bads. We use the generic term utility * for both cases, which will generate no confusion. Only the underlying preferences matter: for any λ > 0, u i and λu i carry the same information. This restriction is formally included in Definition 1 below.
Given an allocation z we write agent i's corresponding utility * as U i = u i · z i = A u ia z ia . Clearly a "null agent" (∀a : u ia = 0) can be ignored when we divide goods. When we divide bads, the problem is trivial if there is a null agent (U = 0 is feasible and uniquely efficient). Thus we only look at problems where all agents are non null. Moreover if we divide bads, the vector U = 0 is feasible if (and only if) each bad is harmless to at least one agent (∀a∃i : u ia = 0): such problems are also trivial and we also rule them out in the Definitions below.
Similarly if item a gives u ia = 0 for all i, it is a "useless good" or a "harmless bad" that can be ignored as well. Our Competitive rule to divide bads goes one step further: it will also ignore a bad a harmless to some agents, and give no credit to these agents for eating a. See Definition 4. Definition 1 A division problem is a triple Q = (N, A, u) where u ∈ R N ×A + is such that the N × A matrix [u ia ] has no null row, no null column, and in the case of bads there is at least one column with no null entry. We write Ψ(Q) for the set of feasible utility * profiles, and Ψ ef f (Q)for its subset of efficient utility * profiles. i. e., the North East frontier of Ψ(Q) if we divide goods, and its SouthWest frontier if we divide bads.
The structure of efficient allocations in the linear domain is key to several of our results. Given We use two equivalent definitions of a division rule, in terms of utility * profiles, or of feasible allocations. As this will cause no confusion, we use the "division rule" terminology in both cases. When we rescale each u i as λ i u i the new profile is written λ * u. Definition 2 i) A division rule F associates to every problem Q = (N, A, u) a set of utility * profiles F (Q) ⊂ Ψ(Q). Moreover F (N, A, λ * u) = λ * F (N, A, λ * u) for any rescaling λ with λ i > 0 for all i. ii) A division rule f associates to every problem Q = (N, A, u) a subset f (Q) of Φ(N, A) such that for any z, z ∈ Φ(N, A):
Moreover f (N, A, λ * u) = f (Q) for any rescaling λ where λ i > 0 for all i.
The one-to-one mapping from F to f is clear. Definition 2 makes no distinction between two allocations with identical welfare consequences, a property often called Pareto-Indifference.
We speak of a single-valued division rule if F (Q) is a singleton for all Q, otherwise the rule is multi-valued. Single-valued rules are much more appealing, as they eschew the further negotiation required to converge on a single division.
Two division rules
The definition of the Egalitarian rule goes back to Pazner and Schmeidler ( [19] ), who introduced it as a welfarist alternative to the competitive approach. In our context we first normalize utilities * so that eating the entire pile of items (goods or bads) gives a utility * of 1 to each participant, then find an efficient utility profile where normalized utilities * are equal. We call a problem Q in Definition 1 normalized if u i · e A = 1 for all i. Because division rules are invariant to rescaling, it is enough to define such a rule F on the subdomain of normalized division problems: if Q = (N, A, u) is not normalized we simply set F (Q) = F (N, A, u) where
Interestingly the definition of the Egalitarian rule is simpler when we divide bads rather than goods. In the case of bads there is always a (unique) efficient normalized utility profile such that U eg i = U eg j for all i, j, which the rule selects. Not so in the case of goods. Consider for instance three agents and two goods a, b where agent 1 likes only a while agents 2, 3 like only b. Efficiency implies that agent 1 eats a and U 1 = 1, while at least one of 2, 3 gets U i ≤ 1 2 . In this example the Egalitarian rule naturally splits b equally between 2 and 3.
In the case of goods we must use a familiar ordering of utility profiles. For any U ∈ R N + , let U * ∈ R n + be the vector with the same coordinates arranged increasingly, and recall that the leximin ordering lx compares U and U as the lexicographic ordering of R n + compares U * and U * . The leximin ordering has a unique maximum on every convex compact of R N + (see e.g. [16] ). Definition 3 Fix a normalized problem Q = (N, A, u). i) If we divide goods,the Egalitarian division rule F eg picks the utility profile U eg maximizing the l eximin ordering in Ψ(Q). ii) If we divide bads,the Egalitarian division rule F eg picks the efficient utility profile U eg such that U eg i = U eg j for all i, j. We check that the Definition ii) makes sense. Set θ = min Ψ(Q) max i U i and pick U in Ψ(Q) achieving θ. Note that θ is positive. Suppose U 1 < θ: then for any i ≥ 2 such that u i · z i = θ we take a small amount of some a such that u ia > 0 and z ia > 0, and give it to agent 1. If these amounts are small enough, we get an allocation z where u i · z i < θ for all i, including 1, contradicting the definition of θ. Thus U i = θ for all i. Now check that U is efficient by a similar argument: if there is some z ∈ Φ(N, A) such that u i · z i ≤ θ for all i and u 1 · z 1 < θ, we can transfer some bads from any agent i such that u i · z i = θ to agent 1, and contradict again the definition of θ. Definition 4 Fix a problem Q = (N, A, u). i) If we divide goods we call the allocation z ∈ Φ(N, A) competitive if there is a price p ∈ R A + such that A p a = n and z i ∈ arg max
ii) If we divide bads we call the allocation z ∈ Φ(N, A) competitive if there is a price p ∈ R A + such that A p a = n and z i ∈ arg min
and for all a ∈ A p a = 0 if u ia = 0 for some i ∈ N (4)
In the case of goods this Definition implies U 0 because each row u i is non null and agent i can afford some amount of a good he likes. Inequality U 0 holds for bads as well because agent i must buy some bads with a positive price, and by (4) he dislikes such bads.
We write the Competitive rule as f c , F c : it selects all competitive allocations or utility * profiles. Existence of such allocations both for goods and for bads is well known, as explained in the companion paper [1] .
Property (4) rules out inefficient solutions of system (3). For example assume two bads, two agents and a b u 1 2 1 u 2 0 1
There are three solutions of (3)
The left one is inefficient, and (4) rules out the right one (though it is efficient).
We give two additional characterizations of competitive allocations, critical to most of our results. The first one is a simple and intuitive system of inequalities.
ii) Case of bads:
The next result is a geometric representation of competitive allocations. Given Q we call U a critical point of the Nash product N (U ) = Π i∈N U i in Ψ(Q) if U ∈ Ψ(Q), U 0, and the hyperplane supporting the upper contour of N at U supports Ψ(Q) as well. Such critical points include the strictly positive local maxima and local minima of N in Ψ(Q). Proposition 1 Fix a problem Q = (N, A, u). i) If we divide goods the Competitive utility profile F c (Q) is the unique maximizer of the Nash product in Ψ(Q). ii) If we divide bads the Competitive disutility profiles in F c (Q) are exactly all the critical points of the Nash product N in Ψ ef f (Q).
Statement i) is well known and goes back to Eisenberg and Gale ( [7] ). A more general version of statement ii) is proven in [1] , to which we refer the reader.
A consequence of Definition 3 and Proposition 1 is that both rules F eg , F c are "welfarist", in the sense that the utility profiles they choose are entirely determined by the set of feasible utilities.
Comparing the two rules

Fair Share Guarantee
The mild and compelling test known as Fair Share Guarantee already appears in the early cake division literature. The idea is to take the possibly inefficient equal division of the resources (where each agent receives 1 n e A ) as the default option that each participant can (virtually) enforce, thus setting a lower bound on individual welfare.
Fair Share Guarantee (FSG) for any Q and any U ∈ F (Q) we have
Clearly both rules F eg and F c meet FSG. However only the former meets the following strict version of FSG.
Strict Fair Share Guarantee (SFSG) if in Q the equal split allocation is efficient, then
A for all i; if it is not we have, for any U ∈ F (Q)
Lemma 3 The Egalitarian rule meets SFSG; the Competitive rule does not if we have at least two agents and/or at least two items.
The SFSG test reveals a weakness of the Competitive rule that the Egalitarian rule does not share.
That the Egalitarian rule meets SFSG is clear if we divide bads, by statement ii) in Definition 3. In order to prove it when we divide goods, fix a problem Q and partition the agents as follows
If equal split is not efficient the set N + is non empty; suppose N 0 is non empty as well and derive a contradiction. Take any good a and agent i in N + such that z ia > 0 and u ia > 0: if some j in N 0 likes a as well, we can improve the utility profile for the leximin ordering by transferring a little a from i to j. Therefore nobody in N 0 likes any of the goods eaten by N + , so by splitting equally the goods that agents in N 0 like among themselves, they each get
A which is the desired contradiction.
We illustrate the second statement by two examples. In the first one we have two agents and two items; the Competitive division is unique, whether the matrix u represent utilities for goods or disutilities for bads:
for bads:
The corresponding utilities and disutilities, illustrated in Figure 1 , are: for goods: Figure 1: For the first example with goods the red circle and the red square represent the competitive and egalitarian utility profiles, respectively. Gray point is the equal split utility profile. Blue points are for the case of bads.
Our second example is a problem with goods with n agents and (n−1) goods, where F c violates SFSG. In this canonical problem the contrast between our two rules is especially stark. We have n agents and (n − 1) goods. The first (n − 1) agents are single-minded : agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, likes only good a i . The last agent n is flexible, he likes all goods equally good a 1 a 2 · · · a n−1
The competitive price is n n−1 for every good: each single-minded agent buys n−1 n units of "his" good while the flexible agent n eats 1 n -th of each good
This is tough on the flexible agent who gets his fair share and no more, while everybody else gets (n − 1) times more! The reason is that in this example the Competitive allocation is the only one in the core from equal split: the coalition of all single-minded agents does not need agent n to achieve its competitive surplus. The Egalitarian rule splits each good i equally between agent i and agent n, and everyone ends up with a share worth one half of the entire manna, much above her Fair Share.
Here we submit that the Egalitarian allocation above gives too much to agent n, who gets (much) more than his fair share of every good. By contrast at a Competitive allocation, here and always, everyone gets at most a 1 n -th share of at least one good: for all i we have min a∈A z ia ≤ 1 n .
3
For fixed sizes of N and A it would be interesting to understand at which problems the ∞ or 1 distance between the profiles of normalized utilities at the competitive and egalitarian allocations, is the largest possible. The canonical example may be a step toward the answer.
Resource Monotonicity
More goods or fewer bads to divide should be good news (at least weakly) for everyone: all agents "own" the goods/bads equally and welfare should be comonotonic to ownership. This general solidarity property has played a major role in the modern fair division literature: [17] , [26] . When it fails someone has an incentive to sabotage the discovery of additional goods.
In the following definition B is a subset of A and we write u [B] for the restriction to R N ×B + of the utility * matrix u ∈ R N ×A + . Resource Monotonicity (RM): for any two problems Q =(N, A, u) and Q =(N, B, u [B] ) where B ⊂ A, we have
(going from A to B is bad news if we deal with goods, and good news with bads). for all a the competitive price must be parallel to u i (or eating of each good would not be a competitive demand) and the equal budget condition p . 4 Note that we sketch the proof of statement ii) in Subsection 7.2 of [1] . We provide here the complete proof in Subsection 6.3.
Recall from [17] (see also [28] ) that in any domain containing the Leontief preferences, we cannot divide goods efficiently while ensuring FSG and RM (this is true even with two agents and two goods). This makes the contrast of goods versus bads in the additive domain all the more intriguing.
Proposition 2 gives a strong argument in support of the Competitive rule when we divide goods, but also shows that this advantage disappears when we divide bads.
The proof that F c meets RM for goods is in Subsection 6.3. We give here a three agent example showing that F eg fails RM: this example illustrates well the logic of the Egalitarian division of goods. It is easy to show that F eg meets RM in two agent problems. We compare the two problems below with B = {a, b, c} and A = {a, b, c, d}
Problem Q(B) is symmetric. Any efficient and symmetric rule allocates goods "diagonally": agent 1 gets all of a and so on; normalized utilities are where agent 1's welfare has decreased.
Independence of lost bids and local misreports
By a local misreport of one's preferences, we mean that a change of report that does not affect the consumption forest Γ(z) identified in Lemma 1. For example the utility matrix u is in U * (N, A) (Subsection 6.1) so that this forest does not change in a neighborhood of u.
We call agent i's marginal utility u ia her "bid" for item a; given a problem Q = (N, A, u) we say that i's bid is "losing" if z ia = 0, and "winning" if if z ia = 1.
Under the Egalitarian rule dividing goods, a profitable local manipulation is to inflate my losing bids and deflate my winning bids; if we divide bads, I want instead to inflate my winning bids and deflate the losing ones. This is the familiar bargaining tactic of playing down the worth on your concession (my share) while exaggerating that of my concession (your share). For instance in problem Q(A) of the previous section, if agent 1 reports u 1a = 5 2 instead of u 1a = 3 (or increases both u 1b ans u 1c to 6 5 ) the apparent egalitarian allocation z becomes the competitive allocation (at u) where she eats all a.
Given a problem Q = (N, A, u) with goods with a single egalitarian allocation z = f eg (u), we call u i a simple misreport by agent i if we have for all a ∈ A z ia = 0 =⇒ u ia ≥ u ia ; z ia = 1 =⇒ u ia ≤ u ia ; 0 < z ia < 1 =⇒ u ia = u ia (9) and at least one inequality is strict. In a problem Q with bads, the same definition applies upon changing the sign of the inequalities.
Lemma 4
Fix Q and a simple misreport u i as above. If f eg (u i , u −i ) = z , and Γ(z ) = Γ(z) the misreport is profitable goods:
The impact of local misreports on competitive allocations is very different. Lowering or raising a losing bid has no impact at all on the entire allocation. This is clear from Lemma 
There is an incentive aspect to this invariance property: to misreport on an item that I do not end up consuming is "cheap", because it is presumably harder to verify ex post my marginal utility * for that item than for an item I am actually eating. Of course the Competitive rule is manipulable by misreporting winning bids, whether we divide goods or bads. But unlike for the Egalitarian rule, whether a profitable manipulation is to increase or decrease a winning bid does depend upon the entire utility matrix.For instance in the three agents, two goods problem
the optimal misreport of u 2a = α is u 2a = √ α, hence it can be above or below the true winning bid α. Definition 5 The rule f is Independent of Lost Bids (ILB) if for any two problems Q, Q on N, A where u, u differ only in the entry ia, and such that u ia > u ia (goods) or u ia < u ia (bads), we have ∀z ∈ f (Q) :
Equal Treatment of Equals (ETE) is the familiar requirement that the rule F should not discriminate between two agents with identical characteristics. For all Q and i, j ∈ N
The Competitive rule for goods is characterized by adding single-valuedness to the above requirements.
We show after the proof (Subsection 6.5) that ILB is a strictly weaker requirement than Maskin Monotonicity ( [14] ) in the linear domain. This relates Proposition 3 to earlier results mentioned in Section 2.
We discuss the tightness of our characterization.
Multiple Competitive divisions
When we divide goods, both rules pick a unique utility profile, and both are easy to compute, respectively by a linear or convex optimization program. This remains true for the Egalitarian rule dividing bads, but not for the Competitive rule.
In all numerical examples of bads problems discussed so far (in Section 4 and subsections 5.1, 5.2) the Competitive rule was single valued. The simplest illustration of the unpalatable multiplicity issue has two agents and two bads:
See Figure 2 . Note that at z c1 agent 1 gets only his Fair Share utility level, while agent 2 grabs all the surplus above equal split; at z c3 agents 1 and 2 exchange roles. Our second example has the same structure as the canonical example concluding Subsection 5.1. We have n agents, (n − 1) bads, and the first (n − 1) agents are single-minded, each over a different bad bad a 1 a 2 · · · a n−1
The allocation (7), respecting the symmetry between the first n − 1 agents, is still competitive at the uniform price n n−1 for each bad: the flexible agent n gets no relief from his equal split share. However there are many more competitive divisions, all with different utility profiles, and breaking at least partially the above symmetry.
Recall the notation e S for the vector in R A with e S i = 1 if i ∈ S and zero otherwise. Pick an integer q, 1 ≤ q ≤ n − 1 and check that the allocation
is competitive for the prices p ai = q+1 q for 1 ≤ i ≤ q and p aj = 1 for q + 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1. In particular agent n's disutility varies from Note that by ILB (Definition 5) the entries 3 in the disutility matrix play almost no role in the computation above: replacing those entries by any γ larger than 2 does not affect the competitive divisions. By contrast the (unique and symmetric) Egalitarian allocation depends heavily upon γ: agent n's disutility decreases to zero as γ grows to infinity.
Our first main result evaluates the extent of the multiplicity issue. Theorem 1 For any problem Q with bads: i) The set F c (Q) of competitive utility profiles is finite. ii) For general n = |N |, m = |A|, |F c (Q)| can be as high as 2 min{n,m} − 1 if n = m, and 2
There is a simple exponential upper bound on the number of distinct Competitive allocations for general n, m. For a given consumption graph Γ, there is at most one competitive allocation (utilitywise): the graph determines the set of active KKT constraints, and we can recover the allocation from Lemma 2. Thus |F c (Q)| cannot exceed the number of bipartite forests on n + m vertices, which is bounded by 2 (n+m) ln(nm) .
5
The canonical example before Theorem 1 proves half of statement ii). The longer proofs of statements iii) and iv) rely on the fact that for n = 2 a problem is entirely described by the sequence of ratios A by-product of these proofs is that |F c (Q)| is odd on an open dense subset of the problems where n = 2 and/or m = 2. A very plausible conjecture is that this is true as well for any n, m.
Single-valued envy free rules: discontinuity
In order to bypass the unpalatable multiplicity issue just discussed we must identify a normatively appealing single-valued selection from the set of Competitive divisions of bads. For instance if the problem involves only two agents and/or two bads, the set of efficient and envy-free allocations is a one-dimensional line (as explained in the proof of Theorem 1) with, generically, an odd number of competitive allocations, so we can choose the median allocation. Alternatively, in problems of any size we can pick among efficient allocations the one maximizing the product of disutilities: it is competitive and generically unique (Lemmas 3, 4 in Section 6 of [1] ). But no such selection can meet the following compelling regularity requirement.
Continuity ( No Envy (NE) of the possibly multivalued rule f . For all Q and all i, j ∈ N for any z ∈ f (Q):
No Envy ensures equality of opportunity "ex post" (after we cut the cake), just like a competitive allocation offers equality of opportunity "ex ante" (the common budget set). As is well known the set of efficient and envy-free allocations contains much more than the competitive ones. For instance with two agents, it contains all efficient allocations guaranteeing Fair Shares. It is therefore surprising, and disappointing that in the division of bads even this fairly permissive test is incompatible with Continuity.
Theorem 2 Say we divide at least two bads between at least four agents and fix a division rule f, F . If F is single-valued and Continuous, then f cannot be also Efficient and Envy-Free.
The statement is tight. A single-valued selection of F c is such that the corresponding selection of f c is Efficient and Envy-free. The rule F eg is Efficient and Continuous. Finally the rule derived from the equal division of all bads, irrespective of disutility functions, 6 is Envy-Free and Continuous.
We prove Theorem 2 as a Corollary of Proposition 4, our last result. There we focus on the topological structure of the set A of efficient and envy-free allocations in problems with two bads a, b, and any number of agents.
Proposition 4 If we divide at least two bads between at least three agents, there are problems Q where the set A of efficient and envy-free allocations, and the corresponding set of disutility profiles, have connected components.
The set A is clearly connected if all problems with two agents, whether we divide goods or bads. In a general problem with goods, we do not know if the set A is always connected. 
Then we can pick arbitrarily small positive numbers ε k such that
and the corresponding transfer to each agent k of ε k units of good k against ε k−1 units of good k − 1 is a Pareto improvement, contradiction. Therefore (12) is impossible; the opposite strict inequality is similarly ruled out so we conclude
Now if we perform a transfer as above where
the utility profile U is unchanged. If we choose the numbers ε k as large as possible for feasibility, this will bring at least one entry (k, a k ) or (k, a k−1 ) to zero, so in our new representation z of U the graph Γ(z ) has fewer edges. We can clearly repeat this operation until we eliminate all cycles of Γ(z). The last statement follows at once from the fact that a forest with n + m vertices contains at most n + m − 1 edges.
b) at almost all profiles each efficient utility profile is achieved by a single allocation
We let U * (N, A) be the open and dense subset of R N ×A + such that for any cycle (14) . We pick a problem Q with u ∈ R N ×A + , fix U ∈ Ψ ef f (Q) and assume there are two different z, z ∈ Φ(N, A) such that u · z = u · z = U . Pick a pair 1, a 1 such that z 1a1 > z 1a1 . Because a 1 is eaten in full there is some agent 2 such that z 2a1 < z 2a1 and because u 2 · z 2 = u 2 · z 2 there is some good a 2 such that z 2a2 > z 2a2 . Continuing in this fashion we build a sequence 1, a 1 , 2, a 2 , 3, a 3 , · · · , such that {z ka k−1 < z ka k−1 and z ka k > z ka k } for all k ≥ 2. This sequence must cycle, i. e., we must reach K, a K such that z Ka K > z Ka K and z ka K < z ka K for some k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. Without loss we label k as 1, and the corresponding cycle as C.
From the reasoning above it follows that for z = (z+z ) 2
, an efficient allocation, there is a cycle in Γ(z ). Then the argument in Section a). implies that u is not in U * (N, A) , as was to be proved.
Lemma 2
Case of goods. Fix Q, U, z as in statement i) and (5). We set p a = uia Ui for all i such that z ia > 0 and note that p · z i = 1 for all i. For all a such that z ia = 0 we have uia Ui ≤ p a : therefore z i is agent i's Walrasian demand at price p, and z is a competitive allocation. Conversely let z ∈ Φ(N, A) and p meet (2) . Recall U 0 because each agent i likes at least one good. If p a = 0 then nobody likes good a (if u ia > 0 then i's demand is infinite, a contradiction of (2)) and system (5) holds for a. Consider now the support A * of p a . Because z i is i's demand at price p the ratio uia pa is a constant π i over the support of z i , and we have: (6) and U 0. Define A 0 = {a ∈ A|u ia = 0 for some i ∈ N } and set p a = 0 for those bads. By (6) the bads in A 0 can only be eaten by agents who don't mind them: z ia > 0 =⇒ u ia = 0. Next in the restriction of Q to A A 0 the same utility profile U is still feasible, strictly positive, and meets (6) . Like in the above argument we set p a = uia Ui for all i who eat some a, and check that we have constructed a competitive price in the sense of Definition 4.
For the converse statement, recall that (3), (4) together imply U 0, and mimic the argument in the case of goods.
Proposition 2
Statement i) the F c for goods is Resource Monotonic. We first generalize the definition of F c , f c to problems where the endowment ω a of each good is arbitrary, and let the reader check that the system (5) capturing the optimal allocations f c (N, A, ω, u) is unchanged. Then we fix N, A, u, ω, ω such that ω ≤ ω . We assume without loss of generality that u contains no null row or column (all agents are interested and all goods are useful).For λ ∈ [0, 1] we write ω λ = (1 − λ)ω + λω , and for every forest Γ in N × A we define
Note that B(Γ) can be empty or a singleton, but if it is not, then it is an interval. To see this take (N, A, ω ) , the forest Γ(z ) is unchanged, and the system (6), which holds at z and z , also holds at z . Thus z ∈ f c (ω ) and the claim is proven. Next we check that inside an interval B(Γ) the rule F c is resource monotonic. The forest Γ is a union of trees. If a tree contains a single agent i, she eats (in full) the same subset of goods for any λ in B(Γ), hence her utility increases weakly in λ. If a sub-tree of Γ connects the subset S of agents, then system (6) fixes the direction of the utility profile (U i ) i∈S , because along a path of Γ the equalities uia Ui = uja Uj ensure that all ratios Ui Uj are independent of λ in B(Γ). As λ increases in B(Γ) the agents in S together eat the same subset of goods, therefore the U i -s increase weakly by efficiency.
Finally Lemma 1 implies that the finite set of intervals B(Γ) cover [0, 1]. On each true interval (not a singleton) the utility profile U λ = F (N, A, ω λ , u) and there is at most a finite set of isolated points not contained in any true interval. Moreover the mapping λ → U λ is continuous because ω → U (ω) is (an easy consequence of Berge Theorem). The desired conclusion U (ω) ≤ U (ω ) follows.
Remark: Sziklai and Segal-Halevi ( [23] ) prove that the Competitive solution is Resource Monotonic in the general cake-division problem, which implies statement i) in Theorem 2. They show that as the cake increases the (normalized) price of the old cake goes down, a different proof technique than ours.
Statement ii) First we repeat the argument in Subsection 7.2 of [1] , focusing on a simple two-person, two-bad example. Suppose the efficient rule F meets RM and FSG and consider the problem
Set U = F (Q). Because (1, 1) is an efficient disutility profile and F is efficient, one U i is bounded above by 1, say U 1 ≤ 1. Then we define
(where we treat 1 9 a as a whole bad) and pick z ∈ f (Q ). By FSG and feasibility:
We generalize the example , first to the case where n = 2n is even, n ≥ 2. Fix two bads a, b. At Q we have n agents with u i = (1, 5n ), i ∈ N 1 , and n agents with u j = (5n , 1), j ∈ N 2 . The profile U = 1 n e N is feasible. Also, at an efficient profile if at least one in N 1 eats some b, then no one in N 2 eats any a, and vice versa. Thus at U = F (Q) at least one of U N1 ≤ 1 or U N2 ≤ 1 is true, say U N1 ≤ 1. Then define Q = ( 1 10n a, b) and use again FSG and feasibility:
This contradicts RM. The case n = 2n + 1 odd is very similar, except that the two groups are of size n and n + 1, with the same utilities as above. If we have more than two bads, say c, d, . . ., we assume their disutilities are very small with respect those for a, b.
Lemma 4
We give the proof in the case of bads, because the definition of the egalitarian allocation is simpler in this case. We omit the slightly more involved argument for goods, where we must deal with the leximin ordering (Definition 3). We fix Q, and u i as in the statement of the Lemma, in particular Γ(z ) = Γ(z). Set
Inequalities (9) (reversed for bads!) imply
because the ratio increases when we first increase u ia to u ia on i's winning bids (the rest of the numerator is not larger than the rest of the denominator), then again when we decrease u ia to u ia on i's losing bids. Next we assume λ ≥ µ and derive a contradiction. It implies
and u i · z i ≥ u i · z i ; together these inequalities contradict the efficiency of z at (u i , u −i ). Therefore λ < µ and u i · z i < u i · z i . Finally Γ(z ) = Γ(z) implies that a winning (resp. losing) bid at z remains winning (resp. losing) at z , so that
follows as desired.
Proposition 3
We already checked that the rule f c meets ILB; also ETE and FSG are clear. Conversely we fix f meeting EFF, ETE or FSG, and ILB and an arbitrary problem Q = (N, A, u), where A contains goods or bads. In the proof we consider several problems (N, A, v) where v varies in R N ×A + , and for simplicity we write f (v) in lieu of f (N, A, v) .
We pick z ∈ f c (u) and check that z ∈ f (u) as well. Set U i = u i · z i and let p be the competitive price at z. In the proof of Lemma 2 we saw that p a = uia Ui for all i such that z ia > 0, and for all j we have p a ≥ uja Uj (resp. p a ≤ uja Uj ) if we divide goods (resp. bads). Moreover p · z i = 1 for all i, and p · e A = n. Consider the problem Q * = (N, A, w) where w i = p for all i. The equal split allocation is efficient in Q * therefore ETE implies F (w) = e N and so does FSG, because p · ( 1 n e A ) = 1. Now if we set w i = U i p the scale invariance property of F (Definition 2) gives F ( w) = U ; moreover z ∈ f ( w) because w i · z = U i for all i. If z ia > 0 we have u ia = U i p a = w ia ; if z ia = 0 we have similarly u ia ≤ w ia for the goods case, or u ia ≥ w ia if bads. Apply finally ILB: after lowering (for goods) or raising (for bads) every lost bid w ia to u ia , the allocation z is still in f (u), as desired.
Finally we check that ILB is in fact a weaker form of Maskin Monotonicity (MM). We do this in the case of bads only, as both cases are similar. Individual allocations z i vary in [0, 1] A and utilities in R A + , so the MM axiom for rule f means that for any two problems Q, Q on N, A and z ∈ f (Q) we have
We fix Q, i ∈ N and z ∈ f (Q), and for ε = 0, 1 we write A ε = {a|z ia = ε} and A + = A (A 0 ∪ A 1 ). The implication in the premises of (15) reads
The cone generated by the vectors w − z i when w covers [0, 1] A is C = {δ ∈ R A |δ a ≥ 0 for a ∈ A 0 , δ a ≤ 0 for a ∈ A 1 }. By Farkas Lemma the implication {∀δ ∈ C : u i · δ ≥ 0 =⇒ u i · δ ≥ 0} means that, up to a scaling factor,
Thus MM says that after lowering a lost bid, or increasing a winning one, the initial allocation will remain in the selected set. Now ILB only considers raising a lost bid, so it is only "half" of MM.
The Competitive rule does not meet the other half of MM.
Theorem 1
Statement i) Fix Q and recall from Lemma 1 that each U ∈ F c (Q) is strictly positive and achieved some z ∈ f c (Q) such that Γ(z) is a forest. There are finitely many (bipartite) forests in N × A therefore it is enough to check that to each forest Γ corresponds at most one U in F c (Q). Consider a tree T in Γ with vertices N 0 , A 0 . If agents i, j ∈ N 0 are both linked to a ∈ A 0 , system (6) implies that U i , U j are proportional to u ia , u ja . Repeating this observation along the paths of T we see that the profile (U i ) i∈N0 is determined up to a multiplicative constant. Now in total the agents in N 0 consume exactly A 0 so by efficiency we cannot have two distinct (U i ) i∈N0 meeting (6).
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Statement ii) Case 1: n > m. We adapt the canonical example before Theorem 1 as follows. For agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, set as before u iai = 1, u iaj = 3 for j = i, and for agents m + 1 to n pick u ia = 1 for all a. Then for any q, 1 ≤ q ≤ n − 1, the allocation
generalizing (11), is still competitive. Case 2: m = n + 1. We use the following example
7 Note that the finiteness result holds even if we drop requirement (4) in Definition 3 but still insist that a competitive allocation be efficient. If A 0 is the set of bads a such that u ia = 0 for some i, then some items in A 0 can have a positive price, and be eaten by agents who do not mind them, eat only in A 0 , and enjoy a disutility of zero; while the other bads in A 0 have zero price, are also eaten by agents who do not mind them but those agents eat also some real bads in A A 0 . For each such partition of A 0 there are finitely many competitive disutility profiles.
For any subset of agents N * ⊆ N the allocation where those agents share equally the bad n + 1, while bad a i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n goes to agent i, is competitive with prices p an+1 = p ai = n * n * +1 for i ∈ N * , p aj = 1 for j ∈ N N * . For the case m > n we take a disutility matrix with m − n copies of the last column. We omit the details as well as the easy argument for the case n = m.
Statement iii) and oddness of |F c (Q)| We fix Q =({1, 2}, A, u). We label the bads k ∈ {1, · · · , m} so that the ratios
increase weakly in k, with the convention 1 0 = ∞.
Step 1. Suppose
. If p is a competitive price we have
Indeed if one of i = 1, 2 eats both k and k + 1, (16) follows by the linearity of preferences, If on the contrary i eats bad k and j eats bad k + 1, then (6) gives
and
. So for a given amount of money spent by i on bads k and k + 1, she gets the same disutility no matter how she splits this expense between the two bads. Hence an interval of competitive allocations obtains by shifting the consumption of k and k + 1 while keeping the total expense on these two bads fixed for each agent. They all give the same disutility profile and use the same price. So if we merge k and k + 1 into a bad k * with disutilities u ik * = u ik + u i(k+1) , all the allocations z ∈ f c (Q) become a single competitive allocation for the new price p k * = p k + p k+1 , with p unchanged elsewhere. When we successively merge all the bads sharing the same ratio
Next for 2 ≤ i ≤ n−1 the allocation z is an i-split if there are numbers x, y such that
Also, z is a 1-split if z 1 = (1, y) and z j = (0, 1−y n−1 ) for j ≥ 2; and z is a n-split if z n = (x, 1) and
is both an i-split and an i + 1-split. If the sequence uia u ib increases strictly, it is clear that an efficient and envy-free allocation must be an i-split. In the next Step we show that this is still true, welfare-wise, if that sequence increases only weakly, then we provide a full characterization in Step 3.
Step 2. Assume the sequence uia u ib increases only weakly, for instance
. Then if z is efficient and envy-free we may have z (i+1)a > 0 and z ib > 0, however we can find z delivering the same disutility profile and such that one of z (i+1)a and z ib is zero. Indeed No Envy and the fact that u i and u i+1 are parallel gives u i · z i = u i · z i+1 and u i+1 · z i+1 = u i+1 · z i , from which the claim follows easily. We conclude that the i-split allocations contain, utility-wise, all efficient and envy-free allocations.
Step 3. If the cut z i/i+1 is in f c (Q), the corresponding price is p = (i, n − i), and the system (6) reads
) and each agent must be spending exactly 1:
which gives
We let the reader check that these formulas are still valid when i = 1 or i = n − 1. An i-split allocation z is strict if it is not a cut, which happens if and only if both x, y in (19) are strictly positive. By (22) , for any i ∈ {1, · · · , n} there is a strict i-split allocation that is competitive if and only if
(with the convention 1 0 = ∞).
Step 4. Counting competitive allocations. There are at most n competitive (strict) i-split allocations, and n − 1 cuts z i/i+1 , hence the upper bound 2n − 1. An example where the bound is achieved uses any sequence uia u ib meeting (23) for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, as these inequalities imply (21) for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1}.
Step 5. Oddness of |F c (Q)|. For the utility profiles such that all the inequalities (21) and (23) 
n−i * , hence the i * /i * + 1-cut is not competitive. Similarly one checks that between two adjacent competitive split allocations there is exactly one competitive cut allocation.
Proposition 4
Step 1 the case m = 2 As in the previous proof we fix a problem (N, {a, b}, u) where the ratios r i = uia u ib increase strictly in i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. We write S i for the closed rectangle of i-split allocations (19) , (20): we have
, and S i ∩ S j = ∅ if i and j are not adjacent. We saw that envy-free and efficient allocations must be in the connected union of rectangles B = ∪ n i=1 S i . Writing EF for the set of envy-free allocations, we describe now the connected components of A = B ∩ EF. Clearly the set of corresponding disutility profiles has the same number of connected components.
We let the reader check that the cut z i/i+1 is envy-free (EF) if and only if it is competitive, i. e. inequalities (21) hold, that we rewrite as:
If z i/i+1 is EF then both S i ∩ EF and S i+1 ∩ EF are in the same component of A as z i/i+1 , because they are convex sets containing z i/i+1 . If both z i−1/i and z i/i+1 are EF, so is the interval i ∩ EF = ∅ while neither z i−1/i nor z i/i+1 is in EF, the convex set S i ∩ EF is a connected component of A because it is disjoint from S i−1 ∩ EF and S i+1 ∩ EF, and all three sets are compact. In this case we speak of an interior component of A. We claim that S i contains an interior component if and only if i − 1 n − i + 1 < r i−1 < r i < r i+1 < i n − i
where for i = 1 this reduces to the two right-hand inequalities, and for i = n to the two left-hand ones. The claim is proven in the next
Step. Now consider a problem with the following configuration: r 1 < r 2 < 1 n − 1 < 3 n − 3 < r 3 < r 4 < r 5 < 4 n − 4 < < 6 n − 6 < r 6 < r 7 < r 8 < 7 n − 7 < 9 n − 9 · · · By inequalities (24) we have z i/i+1 ∈ EF for i = 3q − 1, and 1 ≤ q ≤ n 3 , and no two of those cuts are adjacent so they belong to distinct components. Moreover S i contains an interior component of A for i = 3q − 2, and 1 ≤ q ≤ n+2 3
, and only those. So the total number of components of A is as desired. We let the reader check that we cannot reach a larger number of components.
Step 2: {S i contains an interior component} ⇐⇒ {inequalities (25) hold } Pick z ∈ S i as in (19) , (20) and note first that for 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, the envy-freeness inequalities reduce to just four inequalities: agents i − 1 and i do not envy each other, and neither do agents i and i + 1 (we omit the straightforward argument). Formally
In the (non negative) space (x, y) define the lines ∆(λ): y = λ( ). Thus δ ∈ Γ * if and only if z i/i+1 is EF, and γ ∈ ∆ * if and only if z i−1/i is EF. If neither of these is true γ is above or below ∆ * on the vertical axis and δ is to the left or to the right of Γ * the horizontal axis. But if γ is below ∆ * while δ is right of Γ * , the two cones do not intersect and S i ∩ EF = ∅; ditto if γ is above ∆ * while δ is left of Γ * (see Figures 3A,3B,3C ). Moreover γ above ∆ * and δ right of Γ * is impossible as it would imply 1 n − i + 1 > r i i − 1 and 1 i > 1 r i (n − i) a contradiction. We conclude that {S i ∩ EF = ∅ and z i−1/i , z i/i+1 / ∈ EF } holds if and only if γ is below ∆ * and δ is to the left of Γ * , which is exactly the system (25). In the case i = 1 the EF property of z reduces to (26) and the i-split allocation has x = 1. If r 1 > 1 n−1 the right-hand inequality in (26) is impossible with x = 1, therefore r 1 < 1 n−1 ; but then the fact that z 1/2 is not EF gives (see (24)) r 2 < 1 n−1 as desired. A similar argument applies for the case i = n.
Step 3: general m Fix a problem (N, {a, b}, u) with and z, z deliver the same disutility profile. Therefore in the two problems the sets of efficient and EF allocations have the same number of components.
Theorem 2
Fix a single-valued, efficient rule f meeting NE. Assume first n = 4, m = 2. Consider Q 1 where, with the notation in the previous proof, we have r 1 < r 2 < 1 3 < 1 < 3 < r 3 < r 4
By (24) and (25) A has three components: one interior to S 1 (excluding the cut z 1/2 ), one around z 2/3 intersecting S 2 and S 3 , and one interior to S 4 excluding z 3/4 . Assume without loss that f selects an allocation in the second or third component just listed, and consider Q 2 where r 1 , r 2 are unchanged but the new ratios r 3 , r 4 are r 1 < r 2 < 3 < r 3 < 1 < r 4 < 1 3
Here, again by (24) and (25), A has a single component interior to S 1 , the same as in Q 1 : none of the cuts z i/i+1 is in A anymore, and there is no component interior to another S i . When we decrease continuously r 3 , r 4 to r 3 , r 4 , the allocation z 1/2 remains outside A and the component interior to S 1 does not move. Therefore the allocation selected by f cannot vary continuously in the ratios r i , or in the underlying disutility matrix u.
We can clearly construct a similar pair of problems to prove the statement when n ≥ 5 and m = 2. And for the case m ≥ 3 we use the cloning technique in Step 3 of the previous proof.
